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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
OCTOBER 25, 2018

The Social Meaning of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Linda Sugin
abstract. This Essay exposes the moral messages implicit in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCJA). It argues that the legislation reﬂects values that were not openly debated or discussed in
the legislative process, but are crucial to the distributional effects of the law. The TCJA reduces
progressivity and increases deﬁcits because it favors traditional families, prefers capital to labor
income, treats people as detached from each other, makes charity the narrow concern of the rich,
and privileges the acquisition of assets. Fairness in taxation depends on explicitly identifying social
values that produce economic justice and purposely designing the law to achieve fairness.

introduction
A nation’s tax law reﬂects its values, and tax reform is an important moment
to examine how the tax law deﬁnes national priorities. The changes Congress
made to the Internal Revenue Code in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)1
reveal ideals beyond those Congress explicitly identiﬁed and defended in the legislative process. While scholarly discussion of the proposed legislation focused
primarily on efficiency concerns,2 a wide range of social policies became embedded in the economic structure the tax law creates. Whether policy makers consciously created social policy based on these values is less important. Identifying
these values, though, is crucial, as the resultant policies will affect all Americans
in myriad ways.
1.
2.

Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
See, e.g., Alan D. Viard, Economic Effects of the Corporate Tax Rate Reduction, 158 TAX NOTES
1393, 1400 n.17 (2018) (focusing on the efficiency gains of the corporate rate cut); see also JANE
G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44823, THE “BETTER WAY” HOUSE TAX PLAN: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2, 6-7 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44823.pdf [https://perma
.cc/BGW9-GEYZ] (discussing efficiency as an objective of tax reform in terms of the allocation of capital and the equal treatment of investment).
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This Essay discusses ﬁve American priorities and values revealed by the
TCJA:
1. The traditional family is best;
2. Individuals have greater entitlement to their capital than to their labor;
3. People are autonomous individuals;
4. Charity is for the rich; and
5. Physical things are important.
The TCJA’s distributional effects dovetail with these values. As has been
widely reported, the legislation substantially reduces the tax obligation of the
most affluent Americans and reduces taxes only slightly and temporarily for the
least affluent.3 Reducing the progressivity of the tax system and diminishing total revenue collected is consistent with implementing these ﬁve priorities and
values. First, traditional families with a single working spouse and a stay-athome spouse are disproportionately prosperous, so subsidizing that family
model reduces progressivity. Second, access to capital increases with affluence,
so a greater entitlement to investment income favors taxpayers who enjoy that
affluence. Third, valuing individual autonomy is consistent with robust individual property rights, and less consistent with high levels of taxation for shared
community purposes. Fourth, favoring the charitable giving of the rich allows
them tax reductions not available to others, and sends the message that philanthropy substitutes for tax paid. Fifth, prioritizing physical assets favors individuals are able to invest in such assets and underrates the important value that
workers contribute to prosperity.
Critics of the legislation concerned about the law’s reallocation of tax burdens
down the income scale4 and its projected budgetary deﬁcits5 must focus more on

3.

4.

5.

See William Gale, Surachai Khitatrakun & Aaron Krupkin, Winners and Losers After Paying for
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX POL’Y CTR. 11 (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter
.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publication/150211/winners_and_losers_after_paying_for_the_tax
_cuts_and_jobs_act_12.8.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK34-KWEK].
See, e.g., David Cole, Taxing the Poor, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (May 10, 2018) https://www.nybooks
.com/articles/2018/05/10/taxing-the-poor [https://perma.cc/A7YY-HACD] (arguing that
the TCJA will hasten the collapse of the middle class and thus destroy American constitutional
government); see also Patrick Driessen, Tracing the TCJA’s Radical Regressivity, 158 TAX NOTES
1069, 1069 (2018) (offering a closer look at the distributional analyses used during the congressional deliberation of the TCJA and how such presentations resulted in one of the “most
distributionally lopsided, broad U.S. legislative enactments ever”).
See, e.g., Edward Kleinbard, Senators Picked Americans’ Pockets via Degraded Tax Policy Process,
HILL (Dec. 4, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/ﬁnance/363096-senators-picked
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these embedded priorities. The distributional effects ﬂow from these principles,
not vice versa. The ultimate fairness of the tax system depends on deliberately
creating a substructure that reﬂects equality, community, and dignity as core tax
policy values. Only after lawmakers engage in this fundamental examination will
tax reform lead to distributive justice.
This Essay proceeds by examining how each of these ﬁve values is reﬂected
in the TCJA. For some of the provisions discussed, there are well-known efficiency justiﬁcations for the legislation. I aim here to emphasize that efficiency is
a value. It deserves no deﬁnitive inﬂuence on policy and is appropriately weighed
against other values in assessing proposed legislation. While I disagree with
some of the underlying values reﬂected in the TCJA, this Essay is not intended
to convince the reader that particular values are best. Instead, its goal is to reveal
the embedded beliefs that did not receive attention in the process of adopting
the new law. Only by explicitly considering the social meaning embedded in the
tax law will policy makers be able to purposely strive for justice in taxation.
i. the “traditional family” is best
The TCJA made several changes to the way that families are taxed. The tax
law has long favored families with two parents, one breadwinner, and children
living in the same home; the TCJA further increased the relative beneﬁts to these
“traditional” families. The traditional family, in this paradigm, is increasingly
affluent and white,6 and the tax law normalizes this paradigm further. The TCJA
increases the tax beneﬁts for traditional families by changing the rate structure,
stigmatizing head-of-household ﬁling, and modifying the rules concerning tax
beneﬁts for children. It also reinforces the norm of the traditional family by
changing the tax treatment of alimony payments. After the TCJA, alimony payments are subject to more tax than they were before, making it more expensive
for divorcing spouses. The new rule effectively imposes a new tax on divorce. I
examine each of these measures below.

6.

-americans-pockets-via-degraded-tax-process [https://perma.cc/7CHT-QU5P] (“[W]hatever virtues the [TCJA] might have are completely swamped by its trillion-dollar plus impact
on government deﬁcits.”).
Parenting in America: Outlook, Worries, Aspirations Are Strongly Linked to Financial Situation,
PEW RES. CTR. 1, 6-7 (Dec. 17, 2015), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads
/sites/3/2015/12/2015-12-17_parenting-in-america_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U2BW
-TATS] (stating that 72% of white children live with two married parents in contrast to 31%
of black children, and that only 10% of children living with two married parents live below
the poverty line, compared with 31% of children living in single-parent households).
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A. Rates
The rate structure is somewhat complex in its operation because there are
different rate schedules for different types of ﬁlers.7 Married people ﬁle a single
joint return on which they aggregate their income and pay tax on the combined
amount. Unmarried individuals ﬁle as single taxpayers, or heads of household,
depending on whether they have dependent children.8 Every ﬁling status has the
same graduated rates, but the “rate breaks” differ.
“Rate breaks” are the dollar amounts where higher marginal rates begin. In
a graduated rate system, all taxpayers enjoy the beneﬁt of lower rates on their
ﬁrst dollars of income; their highest rate is only applied to their last dollars
earned. A taxpayer’s “marginal rate” is the rate on her last dollars earned (i.e., at
the margin). All taxpayers are subject to the same graduated rates, but because
the rate breaks differ, single taxpayers start to pay tax at higher rates at lower
income levels than do married taxpayers. For example, in 2018, single individuals
begin paying tax at 22% on earnings in excess of $38,700, while married ﬁlers
pay tax at 22% on earnings in excess of $77,400.9 The breaks are lowest for single
people, higher for heads of household, and highest for married taxpayers ﬁling
jointly.10 Because married couples ﬁle jointly, the law effectively splits their total
income between them. But since married people only require a single household,
the rate breaks for joint ﬁlers are not always double what they are for single ﬁlers.
At the highest incomes, the breaks for married and single ﬁlers become closer.
To wit, the 37% bracket begins at $500,000 for single ﬁlers and $600,000 for
joint ﬁlers.11 At that level of income, the rate structure assumes that married couples can afford to pay more tax than two single people who each earn half the
total income.12
7.

See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2054-58 (2017)
(amending I.R.C. § 1 by changing the rate tables for each ﬁling type).
8. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2018) (deﬁning “head of household” as an individual who is not married at
the close of the taxable year, is not a surviving spouse, and maintains a household for either a
qualifying child of the individual or the individual’s parents).
9. Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392, 394-400 (providing tax rate tables).
10. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11001(a). The 22% rate break does not go into effect until a married couple ﬁling jointly earns at least $77,400, whereas the same rate break triggers when a
head of household earns $51,800, and the single ﬁler makes $38,700.
11. See id. A head of household must also earn $500,000 before qualifying for the 37% bracket.
12. Under the TCJA, only the highest income taxpayers are subject to this convergence. Prior to
2018, this type of convergence started at much lower incomes. For example, two unmarried
taxpayers who each earned $150,000 in 2017 would have paid less tax than a married couple
with the same total income. Single taxpayers would have paid $34,981.75 each, for a total of
$69,963.50, while married ﬁlers would have paid $74,217. See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45
I.R.B 707, 709 (providing 2017 tax rate tables).
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Whether married people pay more or less than they would as single ﬁlers
depends on the allocation of income earned between them. Where one spouse
earns all the income, the couple beneﬁts from splitting their income; they receive
a “marriage bonus” compared to what they would pay if they each paid tax as
single ﬁlers.13 Where the spouses each earn half of the total joint income, they
sometimes pay a “marriage penalty” compared to what they would have paid as
single ﬁlers.14
The law could eliminate marriage penalties by doubling the rate break for
married ﬁlers compared to single ﬁlers. But reducing marriage penalties simultaneously increases marriage bonuses. Under prior law, only lower-income taxpayers were protected from marriage penalties15 and guaranteed marriage bonuses in the rate structure, because the rate breaks doubled below the 25%
marginal rate, covering single taxpayers earning up to $38,700 and joint ﬁlers
earning up to $77,400.16 That structure makes a lot of sense for lower-income
taxpayers. At the bottom of the income spectrum, reducing the secondary
earner’s disincentive to work is an important policy that increases the real disposable income of low-income families. In addition, the earned income tax
credit, which is available only to low-income taxpayers, contains a severe marriage penalty that other provisions in the Code might ameliorate.17
At higher income levels, increasing marriage bonuses may not be worth the
lost revenue. But the TCJA increased marriage bonuses by doubling the rate

13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

For example, in 2017, a couple with $400,000 in joint income (earned by either spouse) would
have paid $102,800 in tax. If they were single and earned all $400,000, they would have paid
$114,725. They received a marriage bonus from the rate structure. On the other hand, if they
were single and each earned $200,000, they would have each paid $45,860, or $91,720 total.
They received a marriage penalty from the rate structure. To play with the numbers, see 2018
FOUND.
https://taxfoundation.org/2018-tax
Tax
Reform
Calculator,
TAX
-reform-calculator [https://perma.cc/LAS2-JULQ]. This illustration uses 2017 numbers because, as discussed in the text, the TCJA minimizes marriage penalties and expands marriage
bonuses. In 2018, only the highest income taxpayers with equally divided earnings are potentially subject to marriage penalties. Most married taxpayers—at all income levels—are much
more likely to enjoy marriage bonuses.
This was much more likely under prior law, when the rate breaks were not double for married
ﬁlers. See generally Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty The Working Couple’s Dilemma, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 27 (1978) (explaining the concept of a marriage penalty).
See I.R.C. § 1(f)(8) (2018) (eliminating the marriage penalty in the 15% bracket starting in
the 2004 taxable year).
See Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-45 I.R.B. 489, 491 (showing tax tables with inﬂation adjustments
for 2018 based on pre-TCJA law with rate breaks that do not double above the 15% marginal
rate).
See I.R.C. §32(b)(2)(B)(i) (increasing the phaseout amount of adjusted gross income for
purposes of qualifying for the Earned Income Tax Credit by only $5,000 if ﬁling jointly).
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breaks for married ﬁlers earning up to $400,000.18 Unlike prior law, which limited the marriage beneﬁt to lower and middle-income families,19 the TCJA creates a clear subsidy for affluent traditional families. High-income earners can
best afford to support stay-at-home spouses, and the marriage bonus incentivizes those spouses to remain out of the market. Stay-at-home spouses perform
important untaxed work in the household that dual-worker couples must pay
for out of after-tax dollars. Under the new law, these families are doubly beneﬁtted by both the rate structure and the non-taxation of spousal work performed
in the home.
B. Heads of Household Filers
The TCJA disfavors nontraditional families by imposing new burdens on
taxpayers ﬁling as heads of household—a ﬁling status generally used by single
mothers with children.20 On average, heads of households earn substantially less
income than joint ﬁlers.21 The TCJA imposes a new obligation on tax preparers
to investigate taxpayers’ eligibility to ﬁle as a head of household.22 Preparers are
subject to a $500 penalty for each failure to exercise due diligence in making that
determination.23 Consequently, the new law requires preparers to disproportionately police single mothers, which operates in contrast to the general expectation that taxpayers will honestly report their tax-relevant information to preparers and the government.
18.

19.
20.

21.

22.

23.

See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2055 (2017); Rev.
Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392, 394-400 (providing tax rate tables for the TCJA with rate
breaks that double for joint ﬁlers compared to unmarried taxpayers with up to $400,000 in
joint income).
See supra text at note 16.
See, American Families and Living Arrangements: 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl. FG10 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/families/cps-2017.html (showing that out
of approximately 12 million single-parent families with children under the age of 18, nearly
9.5 million, or more than 80%, were headed by single mothers).
In the 2015 tax season, 30.5% of married ﬁling jointly taxpayers had an adjusted gross income
(AGI) of $50,000 or less, whereas 59.6% of head of households had an AGI of $50,000 or
less. See All Returns: Adjusted Gross Income, Exemptions, Deductions, and Tax Items, Tax Year
2015, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15in12ms.xls [https://
perma.cc/7EKU-5TQT] (last visited June 24, 2018).
See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2058 (2017) (“Any
person who is a tax return preparer with respect to any return or claim for refund who fails to
comply with due diligence requirements imposed by the Secretary by regulations with respect
to determining—(1) eligibility to ﬁle as a head of household (as deﬁned in section 2(b)) on
the return, or (2) eligibility for, or the amount of, the credit allowable by section 24, 25A(a)(1),
or 32, shall pay a penalty of $500 for each such failure.”).
See id.
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The new law makes heads of households objects of suspicion, despite the
lack of evidence that unmarried adults with children are more likely to cheat on
their taxes than others. Why single out individuals who are claiming that they
support children? The law evinces no parallel suspicion of joint ﬁlers with children—in other words, the traditional family. It does not require that paid preparers investigate small businesses that may be hiding cash, even though a disproportionate amount of tax evasion occurs in those businesses.24 The new rule
for tax preparers is simply a way to stigmatize unmarried adults with children,
and make it harder for them to claim tax beneﬁts. In contrast with the traditional
family, a single adult with children is not considered normal under the tax law.
As a practical matter, paid preparers serving low-income communities will
now be more likely to err on the side of treating mothers as single taxpayers,
rather than heads of household, and consequently requiring them to pay more
tax than they legally owe. The presumption that unmarried individuals with
children are more likely to cheat on their taxes by claiming imaginary children
feeds the worst stereotypes of the poor. Potential head-of-household ﬁlers are
the new “welfare queens”—perpetuating the historic demonization of poor
women.25 And unfortunately, many low-income taxpayers must use paid preparers because they lack access to other advice about preparing their returns, and
because the earned income tax credit is too complex for many low-income taxpayers to navigate by themselves.26 There is a history of paid preparers scamming low-income taxpayers to increase their own fees,27 so Congress’s decision

24.

See Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008-2010, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 4 (2016), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JWQ-XGQL] (reporting that out of the $264 billion individual income tax gap (i.e., tax not collected) in the tax
years 2008-2010, $125 billion came from business income).
25. See generally Rachel Black & Aleta Sprague, The Rise and Reign of the Welfare Queen, NEW AM.
(Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-135/rise-and-reign-welfare
-queen [https://perma.cc/3YED-UAK7] (tracing the origin of the term “welfare queen” to a
Reagan campaign speech made in 1976 and noting the term’s background in a “long and
deeply racialized history of suspicion of and resentment toward families receiving welfare in
the United States”).
26. See Brieﬁng Book: A Citizen’s Guide to the Fascinating (Though Often Complex) Elements of the
Federal Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR. 189 https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles
/brieﬁng-book/tpc-brieﬁng-book_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW5M-YQ6N].
27. See Campbell Robertson, Tax Preparers Targeting Poor with High Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/us/tax-season-brings-big-refunds-and
-preparers-clamoring-for-a-slice.html [https://perma.cc/2SNQ-PZM9]; see generally Maggie R. Jones, Tax Preparers, Refund Anticipation Products, and EITC Noncompliance (U.S. Census Bureau, CARRA Working Paper No. 2017-10, 2017), https://www.census.gov/content
/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2017/adrm/carra-wp-2017-10.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BU8T-SGJB].
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to encourage preparers to act against the interest of their low-income clients is
particularly troubling.
C. Children
The TCJA simpliﬁes the tax treatment of families with children by repealing
dependency exemptions for children28 and increasing the child credit in two
ways: ﬁrst, by increasing the credit amount to $2,000 per child,29 and second,
by making it available to high-income taxpayers who previously were phased
out.30 The phase-out range now begins at $400,000 of income for joint ﬁlers,
and $200,000 for others.31 Because high-income families are better able to afford
a stay-at-home parent, the increased income threshold is a beneﬁt for those families. Under prior law, the value of dependency exemptions depended on a taxpayer’s marginal rate, but phased out altogether for high-income taxpayers.32
The interaction of the changes affecting families is hard to generalize—some
families will enjoy net beneﬁts from the cumulative changes and others will suffer from greater tax liabilities.
More importantly, the beneﬁt traditional families enjoy from this legislative
change is partly a product of what Congress chose not to do. Tax beneﬁts for
children have long taken two forms: one for children generally,33 and the other
speciﬁcally for childcare.34 The dependent-care credit is designed for working
parents, and alleviates the tax burden on parents who must pay for care with

28.

29.
30.

31.
32.

33.
34.

Pursuant to the TCJA, all personal exemptions are reduced to zero through 2025. See Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11041(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2082 (2017) (suspending deductions for personal exemptions).
See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11022(a) § (amending I.R.C. § 24 (h)(2) (2012) by increasing the
credit amount from $1,000 to $2,000).
See id. (adding the new phaseout range at I.R.C. § 24(h)(3) and thus rendering I.R.C. § 24
(b)(2) moot for the years 2018 through 2025: the previous phaseout amount was $110,000 for
joint returns, $75,000 for nonmarried individuals, and $55,00 for married individuals ﬁling
separately).
See id.
See I.R.C. §§ 68(b), 151(d)(3) (2018) (reducing the exemption amount by the “applicable
percentage” of two percentage points for each $2,500 “by which the taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income for the taxable year exceeds” $300,000 for a married couple ﬁling jointly, $275,000
for a head of household, and $250,000 for a single taxpayer).
Child Tax Credit, I.R.C. § 24 (2018).
Expenses for Household and Dependent Care Services Necessary for Gainful Employment,
I.R.C. § 21 (2018).
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after-tax dollars.35 Tax beneﬁts for childcare beneﬁt only working parents.36 Unfortunately, because the credit is nonrefundable, it is unavailable to many parents
who most need help affording quality care.37 Nonrefundable credits offset tax
owed, but do not authorize the government to make payments, creating a crucial
distinction between individuals with income tax liability and those without. 38
Because low-income taxpayers pay more payroll taxes than income taxes, 39 it is
arbitrary that tax credits are only allowed against income tax liability. All credits
would be refundable under a fairer tax law.40
Instead of doubling the child credit, Congress could have used those resources to make the childcare credit refundable (and larger) so that low-income
parents would receive a beneﬁt. Tax beneﬁts for expenses incurred in providing
childcare promotes horizontal equity between taxpayers who pay for care and
taxpayers who provide the care themselves, generally by a stay-at-home spouse.
By choosing to increase the credit that is available to all taxpayers, including
those who do not pay for child care, the TCJA privileges families with a stay-athome parent—who enjoy tax beneﬁts without offsetting tax costs.

35.

36.
37.

38.

39.

40.

See S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 132 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3565 (changing
the structure of dependent care expenses from an itemized deduction to a tax credit because
“the committee believes that such expenses should be viewed as a cost of earning income for
which all working taxpayers may take a claim”).
See I.RC. §§ 21(a)(1)-(b)(2) (stating that the credit is only applicable toward “employmentrelated expenses . . . incurred to enable the taxpayers to be gainfully employed”).
See Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, Cong. Research Serv., R44993, Child and Dependent Care
Tax Beneﬁts: How They Work and Who Receives Them 1 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/R44993.pdf [https://perma.cc/D47N-TD3J].
See Margot L. Crandall-Hollick & Gene Falk, Cong. Research Serv., IN10816, Tax Reform:
The Child Credit and the Child Care Credit (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10816
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5XB-X9P6] (“Since the child care credit is not refundable, it can only
reduce the federal income tax liability of families that would otherwise owe taxes.”).
See Howard Gleckman, For Most Households, It’s About the Payroll Tax, Not the Income Tax, TAX
POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/most
-households-its-about-payroll-tax-not-income-tax [https://perma.cc/Q6LS-DZD5] (“For
two-thirds of households, the levy that matters is the payroll tax . . . . [I]ncome tax payments
don’t begin to exceed payroll taxes until household incomes reach six ﬁgures . . . .”).
See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Assessing President Trump’s Child Care Proposals, 70 NAT’L TAX J.
759, 778 (2017).
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D. Alimony
The tax treatment of alimony has traditionally allowed the payer a deduction41 and required that the recipient include the amount in income.42 The TCJA
changed the scheme so that neither party includes nor deducts alimony payments, effectively taxing the person who pays the alimony, rather than the one
who receives it. 43 Although largely conjectural at this point, family-law experts
predict that the divorce rate will spike in 2018, as the TCJA provision repealing
the deduction for alimony payments does not go into effect until December 31,
2018.44 Family law groups have also reported seeing a “real impact” of repealing
the alimony deduction, with mounting pressure on couples to ﬁnalize divorces
before the new tax changes come into effect.45
Since recipients of alimony are necessarily poorer than those who pay it, the
new rule taxes alimony at the higher rate. For example, if W is taxed at a 10%
marginal rate, and H is taxed at a 30% marginal rate, $100 earnings by H will be
subject to $30 in tax, leaving him $70 to pay as alimony. Under prior law, the
alimony would have been deductible to H, leaving him $100 to pay to W, who
would have to pay $10 tax on that amount, leaving her $90 to spend. That $20
tax difference is why the revenue projections for the Act show that the change
will substantially increase the revenue collected on alimony payments.46
Because the government will be taxing alimony more heavily than it did before, divorced couples will have less money between them after tax. In this way,
the TCJA provides an incentive to stay married. Divorced spouses receive no
41.
42.
43.

44.

45.
46.

See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(10), 215 (2012) (repealed 2017) (allowing for the deduction of alimony
payments to be included in adjusted gross income).
See Id. § 61(a)(8) (amended 2017) (including alimony and separate maintenance payments in
the general deﬁnition of gross income).
See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11051(a)-(b), 131 Stat. 2054, 2089-91 (2017)
(striking I.R.C. § 215; repealing the deduction for alimony payments; and repealing provisions providing for inclusion of alimony in gross income).
See Jonathan Curry, Alimony and Trust Tax Changes Make 2018 ‘Year of Divorce’, 159 TAX NOTES
717 (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/alimony
-and-trust-tax-changes-make-2018-year-divorce/2018/04/30/2808x
[https://perma.cc
/M9KP-HRWW].
Id.
See Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, “The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,”
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N 3 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=start
down&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/8TGM-539T] (estimating $6.9 billion revenue over the
10-year window); see also George D. Karibjanian, Richard S. Franklin & Lester B. Law, Married Taxpayers: INSIGHT: Alimony, Prenuptial Agreements, and Trusts under the 2017 Tax Act—
Part 1, 101 DAILY TAX REP. 13 (May 24, 2018) (demonstrating that a $60,000 alimony payment
will generate nearly twice as much, or $20,000 more, in “combined income tax consequences”
under the new alimony rule).
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beneﬁt from the substantial marriage bonuses in the new law, and will have a
higher burden on alimony payments. So, the TCJA favors the traditional family
in which spouses remain married by simply taxing them less.
Alimony recipients will no longer pay tax, but they are unlikely to be better
off. While it is possible that the poorer alimony recipient will have more money
to spend now that her alimony is not being taxed to her (making her better off ),
the alimony payer will have less money to spend on alimony because his higher
tax burden makes him worse off. If family law decisions—whether made by
courts or agreement of the parties—ignore taxes, then alimony recipients may
get a windfall from the law’s change. But rational people pay attention to taxes;
taxes are effective nudges because people do change their behavior in response
to them.47
Divorce lawyers should advise their clients to reduce the amount of alimony
to take account of the tax change. That adjustment should be greater than the
tax the recipient spouse would have paid under the old law because the payer
spouse is subject to a higher rate of tax. Because the change in taxation of alimony increases the total tax burden on alimony payments, we can expect both
parties to be worse off under the new law.
More importantly, the change in the alimony rules sends a message about
ﬁnancial responsibility within families.48 In contrast with the new law, the prior
rule taxing alimony to the recipient created a framework of entitlement, even for
women who depended on continuing ﬁnancial support from their ex-husbands.
Taxing alimony to the recipient is consistent with treating alimony as an earned
amount, since earnings are always taxed to the earner.49 If we think about marriage as a partnership in which both spouses contribute inputs to produce shared
returns, then the amounts earned in the market by one spouse are appropriately
conceptualized as belonging jointly by both spouses. In an entitlement framework, both spouses contribute valuable services, and they share the beneﬁts
equally, without privileging market returns over nonmarket returns. The joint
ﬁling system reﬂects this conceptualization, as do the rules for property division
47.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 583, 583, 585 (2014).
For more information on nudging, see, generally, RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
48. This message is particularly important given the rarity of alimony payments. See Beth Pinsker,
Breadwinning Women Are Driving Alimony Reform, TIME: Money (Nov. 17, 2015), http://time
.com/money/4116161/alimony-reform-spousal-support
[https://perma.cc/9KYG-NJU9]
(stating that according to the 2010 Census, there are 400,000 alimony recipients made per
year, 3% of which are male; “[u]nlike child support, which is common when [a] divorcing
couple has kids, alimony awards have always been very rare, going from about 25% of cases
in the 1960s to about 10% today”).
49. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940) (“The dominant purpose of the revenue laws
is the taxation of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it . . . .”).
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in divorce.50 Prior law for alimony was also consistent with ownership rights for
both spouses because divorcing spouses who received alimony included that alimony in income, like they would any other amount that they earned. The old
rule signaled that alimony recipients deserved the alimony they received.
The new law changes that conceptualization by emphasizing the payor’s
ownership and entitlement to the funds and treating the transfer from the payor
to the ex-spouse like child support or a gift for tax purposes. This framework
empowers market earners and weakens claims that nonmarket earners may have
on family resources. In this story, alimony-receiving women are like dependent
children who need to be supported, rather than equal partners in a community
venture that produces both monetary and nonmonetary beneﬁts for its members. By treating amounts paid as alimony the same as amounts paid to support
one’s children—whether those children consume in the parent’s household or
not51—the new law implies that ex-spouses are still ﬁnancially dependent members of the market earner’s household.
In returning to the common law regarding alimony, we also return to an outdated notion about family economic power and responsibility. It is the responsibility of parents to support their children—parents have all the economic power
in that relationship. The new alimony rule puts ex-husbands in the parent role,
which suggests that it is the responsibility of former spouses to continue their
spousal support after the marriage ends. Like child support, this approach concentrates power in the hands of the market earner, even though the non-market
worker contributes substantial value to the family. In this way, the TCJA entrenches the power structure of the single-earner family, but does nothing to
improve the ﬁnancial well-being of dependent spouses. Because these are tax
rules, they can change the price of paying alimony, but they cannot change the
rules about when it is paid or how much former spouses receive pre-tax. Normalizing the dependent spouse in the tax law, as the TCJA does, does nothing to
guarantee her ﬁnancial support in property or family law.
Alimony rules are a poor way to encourage behavior in marriages because the
timing is off. Presumably, spouses who will eventually receive alimony do not, at
the time they are deciding whether to work in the market, think they will need
it. They are simply not thinking about the consequences of divorce at that time.
If they had anticipated the need for alimony, they would likely have developed

50.

I.R.C. § 1041 (2018) treats property division between spouses as a non-recognition event so
that each spouse owns the property with a carryover basis from the marriage.
51. The tax treatment of child support does not depend on which parent buys the food and clothing for the children. Child support has never been deductible and is treated as taxable consumption to the earner parent. Tax Information for Non-Custodial Parents, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. (2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4449.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA6F
-HM8B].
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more marketable skills or married another partner, making alimony unnecessary.
The Internal Revenue Code has long encouraged secondary earners to be dependent on primary earners for ﬁnancial support, while performing untaxed
household work, rather than earning wages.52 The new alimony rules do not
incentivize behavior throughout the marriage in the same way that the exclusion
for imputed income and marriage bonuses incentivize secondary earners to stay
out of the market.
The important incentive effects connected to the tax rules for alimony, then,
must coincide with decisions about alimony. By the time of divorce, the secondary earner is ﬁnancially dependent. At that time, the new law removes any incentive for primary earners to pay amounts as alimony, rather than child support,
since the tax treatment of alimony and child support are now the same. The payment of child support in place of alimony might beneﬁt children, but at a potential cost to their mothers. Even more important, as discussed above, the TCJA
increases the after-tax cost of alimony payments, so we can expect that the
amount and frequency of alimony will diminish under the new law. The TCJA’s
economic effects are likely to contribute to the greater impoverishment of divorced women. Its expressive effects are likely to contribute to their social disempowerment.
ii. individuals have greater entitlement to their capital
than to their labor
The primary goal of the TCJA was to cut the rate of tax on corporate income,53 and many tax policy experts—across the political spectrum—agreed that
the U.S income tax rate was too high by global standards.54 Corporate income is
potentially taxed twice—at the corporate level (when earned) and at the shareholder level (when paid out as dividends). The double-tax regime can impose
52.

See generally Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005) (discussing the non-taxation of imputed income, and the stacking of secondary earner income that imposes high rates on the ﬁrst dollars of income).
53. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 12001, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092-94 (2017)
(repealing the tax for corporations under the alternative minimum tax); see also id. § 13001
(changing the corporate tax rate to 21% of taxable income).
54. See Danielle Kurtzleben, FACT CHECK: Does the U.S. Have the Highest Corporate Tax Rate in
the World?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 7, 2017, 10:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/07
/541797699/fact-check-does-the-u-s-have-the-highest-corporate-tax-rate-in-the-world
[https://perma.cc/GAE3-Q523]. President Obama was committed to lowering the corporate
rate. See Zachary Goldfarb, Obama Proposes Lowering Corporate Tax Rate to 28 Percent, WASH.
POST (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-to
-propose-lowering-corporate-tax-rate-to-28-percent/2012/02/22/gIQA1sjdSR_story.html
[https://perma.cc/W3QB-ZA9Q].
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higher effective rates on corporate income than noncorporate income. But the
rationale for reducing corporate rates does not extend beyond corporations.
Nevertheless, the TCJA also substantially reduced the tax imposed on income from noncorporate businesses, such as partnerships and other passthrough entities that tax income only to the owners and not to the entity.55 Consequently, the overall effect of the law is to reduce the tax burden across all holders of capital—people who earn money through investments. The TCJA exacerbated a distinction that already existed in the tax law. Capital income has long
been subject to preferential rates56 and exempt from the payroll tax,57 but now it
is even more preferred, regardless of the form.
A tax preference can be justiﬁed on fairness grounds if the taxpayer has a
greater moral claim to some income than other income, or if the tax would impose greater harm in some cases than in others. For example, an income tax
might include the increase in value of a taxpayer’s home over the course of a
year.58 But a just tax system might exclude that value if it required taxpayers to
sell their homes and move their families. The greater an individual’s moral claim
to something, the less legitimate it is for the government to take it through coercion. Income taxation can be justiﬁed because individuals do not have moral
claims to all of their pre-tax income.59
Proponents of the preference for capital income do not justify it on these
terms. They argue that lower taxes on capital income incentivize more capital
investment. That may be true, but it also may not be.60 In any case, that argument changes the subject because it is an efficiency argument, not an argument
about social meaning and justice. Efficiency may be an important social value,
but where efficiency and fairness are in tension, policymakers should be explicit

55.
56.
57.

58.

59.

60.

Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §§ 11011-12, 131 Stat. 2054, 2063-72 (2017) (“Deduction for Qualiﬁed Business Income of Pass-Thru Entities”).
I.R.C. §1(h) (2018).
The payroll tax is levied only on wage income. Two-thirds of taxpayers pay more payroll tax
than income tax. See Roberton C. Williams, Most Americans Pay More Payroll Tax than Income
Tax, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox
/most-americans-pay-more-payroll-tax-income-tax [https://perma.cc/9J6V-SZ87].
The theoretical deﬁnition of income includes all accessions to wealth. U.S. law includes a realization requirement that limits the inclusion to accessions that are liquidated. See Ilan
Benshalom & Kendra Stead, Realization and Progressivity, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 43, 50-51 (2011).
See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE
15 (2002) (questioning the “‘everyday’ libertarianism” of the pre-tax income framework); id.
at 31-37.
See JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42111, TAX RATES AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 7, 9 (Jan. 2, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42111.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W6SH-ZU3E] (“A review of statistical evidence suggests that both labor supply
and savings and investment are relatively insensitive to tax rates.”).
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about favoring one or the other. Policymakers should not reﬂexively prioritize
efficiency over other public values, particularly in regulating economic entitlements.
Since all income is made possible by myriad forces, both public and private,
an individual is only entitled to some of the income she creates. A lawyer earns
income based on her own personal talent and effort, but also because government creates institutions that make her talents and efforts meaningful to others.
Business income is the product of capital, labor, and social institutions, and taxation is necessary to distribute the products of social cooperation among all the
people who deserve it.61 The TCJA’s tax reduction on business income strengthens the ownership claim of capital holders to that income. But this claim is based
on a mistaken understanding of the social cooperation necessary to create value.
Determining who deserves a share of income is a decision made politically,
but it is a fundamental question of fairness. Taxation is a tool of distributive justice because taxes can correct distributional injustices in the market. While markets can be helpful in determining desert,62 they are not designed to allocate resources according to a moral principle. Markets are designed to increase
efficiency, not justice.63 Laws must supplement markets to achieve justice. Income taxation is a feature of just societies because people do not have unfettered
rights to every dollar of pretax income they earn.64
For example, if free markets systematically undercompensated workers for
their contribution to the social product, the law might tax-prefer their earnings
compared to other types of income. Such a law could give workers a greater
moral claim to their pretax income by granting them dominion and control over
a greater percentage of their pre-tax income. The same is true for investors. In
instituting a preference for a broad range of investment income, the TCJA reﬂects the notion that investors have a stronger claim to their earnings than do
others. Elevating capital holders to a preferred place by taxing their income less
heavily than the income of workers implies greater moral rights to that income.
61.

See Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of Charity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2617
(2016) (“A fair shares framework sees the tax system as a mechanism for dividing the returns
to social cooperation among members of society.”).
62. Some political philosophers have recognized that markets may have a circumscribed role in
distributive justice. See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) (starting with an auction model to build a theory of distributive
justice using insurance concepts and taxation).
63. Elizabeth Anderson explains why markets must be limited if individuals are to enjoy freedom
and autonomy. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 141-167
(1993).
64. Property is conventional. This is Murphy and Nagel’s main point. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 8 (“If there is a dominant theme that runs through our discussion, it is this:
Private property is a legal convention, deﬁned in part by the tax system.”).
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A lower, preferential rate of tax on capital income suggests that market returns
to capital holders are a closer approximation of what capital holders deserve; the
heavier tax on labor suggests that their market returns are excessive by comparison.
As income inequality has increased, capital holders have enjoyed a greater
share of overall market returns.65 Because capital is more mobile than labor,
globalization has allowed capital to seek out greater returns, imposing pressure
on labor. The weakening of labor’s power, including the decline in unions,66 has
left labor earners unable to push back in the market. The market has already
shifted a substantial share of the social product to holders of capital, so the tax
law’s more burdensome treatment of income from work exacerbates a market
dynamic already in effect.
Given the philosophical substructure of the tax law, a policy that implies
greater moral entitlement to capital returns than labor returns is odd. One principle underlying much economic policy reﬂected in the tax law is that individuals
own their labor.67 The theoretical entitlement to earnings on capital stems from
the ownership of labor, since capital must have been derived from labor at some
point. Libertarian arguments make the strongest moral claims to capital income,
but those claims are based on historical principles of entitlement that start with
a person’s right to own his labor and base the right to investment income on that

65.

See Thomas L. Hungerford, Cong. Research Serv., R42131, Changes in the Distribution of
Income Among Tax Filers Between 1996 and 2006: The Role of Labor Income, Capital Income, and Tax Policy 14 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42131.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HLM7-5ZJ6] (“Changes in income from capital gains and dividends were the single largest
contributor to rising income inequality between 1996 and 2006.”).
66. See Justin Fox, What Unions No Longer Do, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 1, 2014), https://hbr.org
/2014/09/what-unions-no-longer-do [https://perma.cc/W73N-GPTU] (“Forty years ago,
about [a] quarter of American workers belonged to unions . . . . Now union membership is
down to 11.2% of the U.S. workforce, and it’s increasingly concentrated in the public sector —
only 6.7% of private-sector workers were union members in 2013.”). Government policy—not
just the market—contributed to the decline in unions. See Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, The Right
to Work Really Means the Right to Work for Less, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/04/24/the-right-to-work
-really-means-the-right-to-work-for-less/ [https://perma.cc/TE8U-P8B7] (discussing the
development of right to work laws that undermine unions).
67. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (John Boyle ed., 1773) (1689)
(describing the labor theory of property).
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history.68 In prior work, I have been critical of this analysis.69 Nevertheless, the
regime in the TCJA turns it on its head: If the taxation of capital gains cannot be
justiﬁed in a libertarian framework, then the taxation of labor returns is even less
legitimate. The TCJA gets it backwards by taxing labor income much more heavily than it taxes capital income.
iii. people are autonomous individuals
It has been recognized that the tax law assumes people are autonomous, and
I have previously argued that it is important for the tax law to respect individual
autonomy.70 The TCJA takes that conception further than prior law by discouraging interdependence among individuals in employment relationships and local communities. The TCJA discourages employer-employee relationships,
compared to independent contractor status. It also rejects the interdependence
of communities by conceptualizing state and local taxes as equivalent to private
consumption expenditures.
The employer-employee context and the local-government context raise different policy concerns that inform the desirability of interdependence.71 In the
employment relationship, interdependence has traditionally implied health insurance and retirement beneﬁts, so that interdependence has been necessary for
the ﬁnancial and personal security of workers. In a society (unlike the United
States) with government-provided health insurance and generous public retirement beneﬁts, employer-employee interdependence would be neither necessary
nor desirable. Employee dependence on employer-speciﬁc beneﬁts discourages
job mobility and entrepreneurship. But weakening the bond between employers
and employees is troublesome if it strips individuals of security and leaves them
vulnerable.
In the local community context, increasing atomization may increase the
likelihood that localities offer different packages of goods and services that individuals want. That is desirable if efficiency is the goal and everyone can afford a
decent package. If people cannot afford the precise package they want, then
treating taxpayers as though they are simply buying consumer goods is unlikely

68.

See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 170 (1974) (beginning with taxation as
slavery based on labor earnings and then extending the analysis to capital earnings based on
a theory of historical entitlement).
69. Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 256-57
(2011) (comparing John Rawls and Robert Nozick and arguing that liberty derives from equal
respect for people, not property rights).
70. See id. at 237 (treating autonomy as a central value in a just tax system).
71. Spousal dependence also raises unique issues. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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to improve overall welfare. In a welfarist framework, the distribution of beneﬁts
to those who can afford them least creates the greatest welfare gains. Interdependence in communities allows small welfare losses to some members of the
community to be outweighed by large gains to others. Discouraging community
interdependence threatens to leave the most needy without adequate public
goods and services.
A. Independent Contractors
The new law creates incentives to operate as an independent contractor, or
sole proprietor, rather than as an employee. Independent contractors are eligible
for the new lower rate of tax for pass-through businesses72 and they are also allowed to deduct all their expenses in operating the business.73 By contrast, if
characterized as an employee, the same person must pay a higher rate of tax and
is not allowed to deduct employee business expenses under the new law.74 The
preference for independent contractors reinforces the notion that individuals are
autonomous and independent of one another. An employer-employee relationship implies substantial reciprocal obligation.
This is an important shift in the message of the tax law, and is actually quite
perplexing, given other provisions favoring employer-employee interdependence that remain in the Internal Revenue Code. The tax law has long favored the
employer-employee relationship as the source for employee consumption expenditures. Many employee expenses that incur tax when made directly by employees have long been tax-free if provided directly by employers.75 The TCJA
did not change the preexisting preference for employee dependence on employer-provided beneﬁts—the tax savings for employer-provided education,

72.

Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §§ 11011-12, 131 Stat. 2054, 2063-72 (2017) (“Deduction for Qualiﬁed Business Income of Pass-Thru Entities”).
73. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11011(a) (deﬁning qualiﬁed items of income, gain, deduction, and
loss as anything “effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States”).
74. The TCJA suspended through 2025 the deduction for miscellaneous itemized expenses, including the trade or business expenses of employees that had long been carved out of I.R.C.
§62(a)(2)(A), but allowed below the line. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11045.
75. When purchased directly by employers, employees need not include in taxable compensation
the value of employment-related goods and consumption. But employees are not permitted a
deduction when they purchase the same goods and services out of their own after-tax income.
See I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(A) (2018) (including reimbursed expenses of employees as part of definition of adjusted gross income, so long as the expenses qualiﬁed under part VI—i.e., the
itemized deductions for individuals and corporations).
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child care, retirement savings, and health insurance remain in the law postTCJA, beside the new law’s incentive to sever the employer-employee bond. 76
Confusing matters further, the TCJA makes employee business expenses
nondeductible, even though employees can exclude those amounts when their
employers pay for them.77 For example, an employee who buys her own work
tools must now pay for them with after-tax income, and is no longer allowed a
deduction. But an employee does not need to include the value of tools that an
employer buys for her,78 and nor does she need to pay tax on amounts she spends
on tools that are reimbursed by her employer.79 Consequently, it continues to be
advantageous to be an employee in this respect.
Whether an individual is better off as an employee or an independent contractor depends on both the rate of tax applied to the income and the items that
must be included in the tax base. Under the new law, the determination will be
different for workers in different businesses—employees with few excluded beneﬁts will prefer to become independent contractors to get the lower rate. But
employees with lots of excluded beneﬁts may prefer the higher rate on the
smaller base. Beyond the individual tax calculus, independent contractors may
be worse off than employees to the extent that they have an incentive to compete
against one another, rather than collaborate for better pay or conditions.
Confusing matters further, the new law carves out certain professions, including doctors, lawyers, accountants, and artists, from the reduced passthrough rate—for no apparent reason.80 Encouraging some employees to become independent contractors could have an important effect on the nature of
business relationships apart from taxation. Whether the law should encourage
interdependence between employers and employees, or independence by service
providers is a difficult policy question, but Congress should be more purposeful
about the project.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 106 (health insurance); § 119 (meals & housing); § 127 (education); § 129
(dependent care); § 401(retirement savings).
See id. § 62(a)(2)(A) .
The exclusion for “working condition” fringe beneﬁts was unchanged in the law. See id.
§ 132(a)(3).
See id. § 62(a)(2).
See Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New US Pass-Through Rules, 1 BRITISH TAX REV. 49, 51
(2018) (“The likes of real estate, oil and gas, manufacturing, and retailing are apparently
‘good,’ while the likes of medicine, law, accounting, consulting, the arts, professional sports,
and corporate management are apparently less good, but one cannot quite tell why.”). Shaviro
ultimately attributed the classiﬁcation to a “sociological divide between the business and educated classes.” Id. at 58.
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B. State and Local Tax Deduction
Diminution of the deduction for state and local taxes81 was one of the most
contested provisions in the new law.82 Critics have correctly recognized the provision as a way for Republicans in Congress—who passed the TCJA without a
single Democratic vote—to punish blue states and raise taxes primarily on affluent Democrats.83 So perhaps there is no identiﬁable value hidden in the amendment to the deduction.
But a deeper analysis of the change reveals a potential shift in thinking about
what state and local taxes do. It is possible to conceptualize state and local taxes
as collective returns to communities, which should be shared by members of
those communities. Institutions of government foster pretax income at every
level, so state and local taxes, like federal taxes, can be understood as marketcorrecting tools that direct returns to communities, rather than individuals.84 In
this understanding, state and local taxes are the distribution of social returns, so
taxpayers are not individually entitled to those amounts.
This interpretation challenges inclusion in the federal tax base, providing a
theoretical justiﬁcation for the deduction. Because individuals do not enjoy dominion and control, the federal government should not consider those tax payments to be gross income of the individual taxpayers. Amounts paid in tax to
states and localities do not constitute an accession to the personal wealth of the
individuals who pay them. State and local taxes are collected under legal coercion, and are never really part of the private resources of state residents. Our
ability to pay federal tax, in this conception, is affected by how much other tax
we pay, as well as how much we earn. A federal tax deduction is necessary to
account for the diminution in resources that state taxpayers have.
This conception of state and local taxes says nothing about whether individuals should have to include the beneﬁts they receive from government in taxable
income, but including beneﬁts is not wholly consistent with the ability-to-pay

81.

See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2085-86 (2017) (reducing the aggregate amount of state and local taxes to be taken into account to $10,000, or
$5,000 in the case of a married individual ﬁling a separate return).
82. See Dylan Matthews, The State and Local Tax Deduction, Explained, VOX (Nov. 2, 2017, 11:25
AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/30/16557554/the-state-and-local
-tax-deduction-explained [https://perma.cc/AC6V-WYLL].
83. See Michael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced Precarious
Policy, 128 YALE L.J.F. 315, 319-22 (2018).
84. See Sugin, supra note 61, at 2617 (“[I]ndividuals are not entitled to their entire pre-tax income
because part of that income is the return to social cooperation that must be shared with others.”).
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norm underlying income taxation. To the extent that governments provide beneﬁts to individuals, the tax system could require inclusion. Individuals could be
taxed on the value of the public education they receive, the clean water they
drink, and the military protection they enjoy. Under current law, where government beneﬁts are provided in cash, they are sometimes included in gross income
and subject to tax.85 Generally, however, such beneﬁts are ignored for tax purposes. The valuation challenges in including all government beneﬁts in taxable
income would be substantial, and beneﬁts taxation is an independent theory for
tax design that has never received substantial traction.86
The TCJA treats state and local taxes just like private consumption. That
model assumes that people pay taxes to buy services like schools and roads.87
Since expenditures for living expenses and luxuries are not deductible under federal law,88 state and local taxes should not be deductible if they are equivalent
expenditures. If individuals receive valuable consumption in return for their
taxes, then those taxes should not be deductible for purposes of measuring ability to pay other taxes. Where state and local taxes are simple consumption expenses, they resemble other nondeductible items. Taxpayers who do not value
schools or roads are free to move to other jurisdictions that offer the package of
taxes and services that they prefer.89
At the local level, this conception of taxes is plausible. But the larger the taxing jurisdiction, the less compelling this private-consumption story becomes. At
the state level, surely, taxes do not translate into the equivalent of fees for services
provided to individuals. This approach to state and local taxes rejects the notion
of a shared community with public goods that cannot be valued for individuals.
It assumes that states and localities have no role to play in distributing common
resources.

85.
86.

87.

88.
89.

See I.R.C. § 86 (2018) (taxing some social security beneﬁts).
John Stuart Mill wrote of beneﬁts taxation: “If there were any justice, therefore, in the theory
of justice now under consideration, those who are least capable of helping or defending themselves, being those to whom the protection of government is the most indispensable, ought
to pay the greatest share of its price: the reverse of the true idea of distributive justice, which
consists not in imitating but in redressing the inequalities and wrongs of nature.” JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 485 (Longmans, Green & Co. ed., 1904) (1848).
See Michael Leachman & Iris J. Law, Eliminating State and Local Tax Deduction to Pay for Tax
Cuts for Wealthy a Bad Deal for Most Americans, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 19,
2017) https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/ﬁles/atoms/ﬁles/10-19-17sfp.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8TG4-8735].
See I.R.C. § 262 (listing personal, living, and family expenses under Title IX – Items Not
Deductible).
See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POLITICAL ECON. 416, 420
(1956).
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It is ironic that Republicans are the ones sending this message about state
and local taxes, because they have traditionally argued more vehemently than
Democrats in favor of state sovereignty.90 The conception of state and local taxes
as paying for private consumption reduces the power and function of the states
in a federal system. Under the TCJA, the federal government becomes the sole
protector of the public interest and the sole provider of public goods, with states
and localities serving up private consumption according to market demands.
The likely effect is a decline in public goods like infrastructure, education, and
health care ﬁnanced by the states.
iv. charity is for the rich
Philanthropy requires resources, so it is nothing new that the wealthy are the
most important donors to charity. Recent research shows that even before the
TCJA, charitable contributions were concentrated in a diminishing slice of the
population.91 Nevertheless, the tax law has historically supported charitable giving of a broader segment of taxpayers by allowing a charitable deduction for all
itemizers. In addition, the Code has long limited the tax beneﬁts attributable to
charitable giving so that even the most generous philanthropists could not avoid
paying taxes entirely.92 While these rules have allowed considerable plutocratic
power and government subsidy to donations by the rich, the TCJA enables this
bias substantially more by reducing the number of itemizers and increasing the
level of allowable deductions. The TCJA does not fundamentally change the
Code’s approach to charitable giving, but it exacerbates (and normalizes) the
elitism that has long underlied the law.93 This is troubling given other changes
90.

See John Stoehr, Forfeiting Federalism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 6, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-12-06/gop-tax
-plan-to-end-state-and-local-tax-deductions-undermines-federalism
[https://perma.cc
/G2CJ-9JTM] (stating the then-proposed tax bill would be a “violation of the states’ rights
the Republicans say they alone represent” by “‘federaliz[ing]’ revenue that would have remained in states under the current system”).
91. See Nicolas J. Duquette, Top Donors and the Rising Concentration of Giving in the United
States, 1960-2012, at 1 (June 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3203135.
92. I.R.C.§ 170(b) (2018).
93. I have previously taken a nuanced approach to the plutocracy of the charitable deduction. See
Linda Sugin, Competitive Philanthropy: Charitable Naming Rights, Inequality and Social Norms,
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 139-40 (2018) (defending elite philanthropy). Since I have argued that
government should be responsible for more public provision, the ideal role of philanthropy is
narrower than its current function. See Sugin, supra note 61, at 2607 (“Charities have an important role in our heterogeneous society connected to fostering pluralism and diversity. They
should not relieve the government of its more fundamental role in ensuring just institutions.”).
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wrought by the TCJA: tax cuts for the rich and bigger government deﬁcits in the
future. Concentrating philanthropy among the most elite is only tolerable if
there is a sufficient level of taxation overall to guarantee public support of public
priorities so that government leaves little need for private organizations to ﬁll.
The TCJA simpliﬁed taxes for millions of Americans by substantially increasing the standard deduction (to $12,000 for single ﬁlers and $24,000 for
joint ﬁlers).94 The charitable deduction is only available to taxpayers who itemize, so only taxpayers whose total itemized deductions exceed the standard deduction will continue to itemize. The Tax Policy Center estimates that the TCJA
will reduce the number of taxpayers claiming the charitable contribution deduction by 21 million.95 While fewer taxpayers in the top 1% are projected to claim
the deduction, fewer than half of former claimants below the 95th percentile will
continue to take the deduction.96
The charitable deduction operates as a government subsidy to charities chosen by taxpayers. For example, an individual in the 35% rate bracket receives $35
in tax savings on a $100 gift to charity. When she makes that gift, it has the same
effect as her paying $65 from her after-tax income and directing the government
to pay the other $35.97 Consequently, the charitable deduction has been compared to a government matching grant.98 Individuals who can claim the charitable deduction are able to direct government subsidies to the charities of their
choosing, while those who cannot claim the deduction must ﬁnance their charitable support without the government’s help.99
94.
95.

96.
97.

98.
99.

See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2085-86 (2017)
(amending I.R.C. § 64(c) (2012)).
See Howard Gleckman, 21 Million Taxpayers Will Stop Taking the Charitable Deduction Under
the TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox
/21-million-taxpayers-will-stop-taking-charitable-deduction-under-tcja [https://perma.cc
/5VL5-UA2H]; see also MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONGR. RES. SERV., IN10820, TAX INCENTIVES
FOR CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (H.R. 1), at 1 (2017), https://fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/IN10820.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE76-G6TF] (noting that the percentage of
taxpayers itemizing deductions is estimated to decrease from 29% to 6% under the new tax
law).
See Gleckman, supra note 95.
This is the core of tax expenditure analysis. See STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM:
THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 50-64 (1973). I have elsewhere been critical of the simpler version of tax expenditure analysis. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 23-25 (2011) (“[I]t is important to know whether a provision actually operates as a subsidy or as an incentive, and who is subsidized or
incentivized . . . .”).
See Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute
for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 380 (1972).
The charitable deduction has been known to provide an upside-down subsidy. See SURREY,
supra note 97, at 136.
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Even before the TCJA was enacted, nonitemizers were ineligible for the charitable deduction.100 Many of them gave to charity, and many will continue to do
so despite the absence of federal subsidy. There are perennial proposals to extend
the charitable deduction to nonitemizers or to convert the deduction into a refundable credit (which would be available to both itemizers and nonitemizers)
in order to democratize the federal subsidy.101 Economists disagree about the
efficacy of the charitable deduction as an incentive to give to charity.102 The TCJA
is a natural experiment, and scholars will surely study the change in giving patterns for taxpayers who itemized prior to the TCJA but claim the standard deduction in the future. New standard deduction claimants may reduce their charitable giving. But even if they continue to give, the new law directs zero dollars
of federal subsidy to the charities chosen by nonitemizers.
By subsidizing only charitable gifts made by the wealthy, the TCJA sends the
message that charity is an important public priority for the rich, but not for others. This is problematic. First, it reinforces the notion that government need not
provide the infrastructure necessary for equality and opportunity since the rich
have a responsibility to provide private support for public goods. Relatedly, this
message gives the rich the false and dangerous impression that their charitable
giving is a reasonable substitute for paying taxes. Finally, the rich and the poor
support different types of institutions, and privileging the giving of the rich undervalues the types of institutions supported by the poor.103
While reducing the number of taxpayers eligible to claim a deduction for
charity, the TCJA also raised the limit on how much itemizing taxpayers may
deduct, by raising the cap on deductibility from 50% to 60% of a donor’s income.104 The Code has long capped charitable deductions to ensure that even

100.
101.

102.

103.

104.

See I.R.C. § 170 (2012) (listing charitable contribution reporting requirements under Part VI
– Itemized Deductions for Individuals and Corporations).
See generally Options for Changing the Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving, CONG. BUDGET OFF.
(2011),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports
/charitablecontributions.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3EL-BVB7] (reviewing the pros and cons of
various redesigns).
See Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 570 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“[I]t is still unclear how
much changes in price affect charitable giving.”).
The rich support education more than any other purpose, while the poor support religion
most. See WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 15 (Charles Clodfelter ed., Univ.
of Chi. Press, 1992).
See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11023(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2074-75 (2017)
(amending I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (2012)): “In the case of any contribution of cash to an organization described in subparagraph (A), the total amount of such contributions which may be
taken into account under subsection (a) for any taxable year . . . shall not exceed 60 percent
of the taxpayer’s contribution base for such year.”).
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very charitable taxpayers must pay some tax.105 Before the change, taxpayers
could deduct only half their income as charitable deductions, and now, they can
deduct up to 60%. A cap on deductibility signals that charitable gifts are not a
substitute for paying taxes; everyone must contribute a fair share to the expenses
chosen by elected officials, and there is no private substitute for supporting those
public purposes. Raising the cap undermines the message of compelled contribution to democratically determined priorities—it implies that amounts given to
private institutions committed to public purposes resemble taxes paid to governments.106 Of course, the change in the cap is moderate—from 50% to 60%,
so the revenue effects will be small, but the fact that Congress made any change
is revealing.
The 50% cap did not present a problem that Congress needed to solve, and
the change will lose some revenue. The increase to 60% will only provide a beneﬁt to a miniscule number of very wealthy taxpayers who can afford to give more
than half their income to charity in any year. Hardly anyone faces the cap—the
average itemizer contributes 2% of income to charity. The way to hit the cap is
to make large gifts out of wealth rather than income; Warren Buffett has this
problem.107 The culture of philanthropy among the super-rich is sufficiently
strong that the cap on deductions has not deterred the richest Americans from
pledging to give away at least half their wealth.108 The cap primarily functioned
as a symbol that charitable giving does not satisfy one’s civic obligation to contribute to the social structure,109 and the TCJA undermines this symbol. Charity
is private in its operation, control, and funding. Charitable decisions are made
in a plutocratic way. There is nothing wrong with that, as long as it is clear that
105.

106.
107.
108.

109.

The charitable contribution deduction dates back to the War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917
and was initially capped at 15% of a taxpayer’s taxable net income. While Congress enacted
an unlimited charitable contribution deduction for any taxpayer who donated more than 90%
of her taxable income for that year and for eight of the preceding ten years, that provision was
phased out in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to prevent tax abuse. The legislative history for the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 indicates that the unlimited charitable contribution deduction was
eliminated because it “allowed a small number of high-income persons to pay little or no tax
on their income,” which members of Congress felt should not be allowed and instead stated
that charity can remain “an equal partner with . . . income,” but should not reduce an individual’s tax base by more than one-half. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1698; see Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A
Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061, 1064-65 (2003).
See Sugin, supra note 61, at 2618 (criticizing the equivalence of charitable giving and taxes
paid).
See Sugin, supra note 93.
See A Commitment to Philanthropy, GIVING PLEDGE, https://givingpledge.org/ [https://perma
.cc/B5TC-BQXV] (“The Giving Pledge is a commitment by the world’s wealthiest individuals
and families to dedicate the majority of their wealth to giving back.”).
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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taxes are not conﬂated with gifts to charity.110 The more the law allows charitable
giving to substitute for taxes, the more it legitimates private control of public
functions.
v. physical assets are important
The new law is evidence that congressional policymakers believe in the value
of tangible things.111 Even though studies have shown that happiness does not
follow from buying things,112 Americans continue to accumulate a lot of stuff.
And the new tax law seems to agree that physical things are best. Despite the
rhetoric about prioritizing jobs for workers,113 the TCJA in fact encourages investment in long-lived assets more than investment in labor. The new law subsidizes the acquisition of long-lived assets by allowing their entire cost to be deducted in the year of acquisition.114 To the contrary, there is no bonus deduction
allowed for wages paid to workers.115 If an employer hires people to perform
services in its business, there is no subsidy because it cannot deduct the cost of
paying the hirees in the future. The key to the subsidy for physical assets is the

110.
111.

112.

113.

114.

115.

This is the main argument in my previous article. See Sugin, supra note 61, at 2621.
See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13202, 131 Stat. 2054, 2108-09 (2017)
(“Modiﬁcations to Depreciation Limitations on Luxury Automobiles and Personal Use Property”).
See generally Leaf Van Boven, Experientialism, Materialism, and the Pursuit of Happiness, 9 REV.
GEN. PSYCHOL. 132 (2005) (extending ﬁndings from previous studies indicating that material
acquisitions are negatively associated with happiness by noting current research that demonstrates that purchases made with the intent of acquiring life experiences make them happier
than acquiring material possessions).
See Deirdre Walsh et al., White House, GOP Celebrate Passing Sweeping Tax Bill, CNN (Dec.
20, 2017, 5:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/house-senate-trump-tax-bill
/index.html [https://perma.cc/NH2F-7JNJ] (“‘This is truly a case where the results will
speak for themselves, starting very soon. Jobs, Jobs, Jobs!’ the President tweeted.”).
See Mihir A. Desai, Tax Reform, Round One: Understanding the Real Consequences of the New
Tax Law, HARV. MAG. (May-June 2018), https://harvardmagazine.com/2018/05
/mihir-desai-tax-reform [https://perma.cc/ZX9F-AH95] (“[E]xpensing allows the tax rate
on new investment to become irrelevant. Under expensing, the ﬁrm gets tax relief at the time
of investment and then later gives up proﬁts—meaning the government is effectively functioning as a joint-venture partner with an ownership level that corresponds to the tax rate. As
such, the pretax and post-tax rates of return are the same, ensuring no distortion to investment decisions.”).
An equivalent treatment for labor would allow employers to currently deduct wages to be paid
to employees in future years.
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new law’s “expensing” for long-lived physical assets.116 Under income tax principles, the cost of long-lived assets should be deducted over time as they are used
in the business;117 “expensing” allows the entire cost to be deducted in the year
of acquisition. As others have explained, “[t]he new law subsidizes rather than
taxes capital investments. In other words, the tax act subsidizes ﬁrms that buy
robots over ﬁrms that hire new workers.”118
Standard tax policy analysis recognizes that deducting the entire cost of a
long-lived asset in the year it is acquired is economically equivalent to exempting
the future income from that asset from tax.119 This happens because the deduction allowed in the year of acquisition when a capital asset is expensed is bigger
than the actual cost to the taxpayer in that year, since the asset will be useful in
the business over an extended period. For example, if a taxpayer buys a machine
that lasts ﬁve years for $100, part of that $100 is a cost of doing business in years
two through ﬁve, but expensing allows it all to be deducted in year one. The
deduction in the year of acquisition reduces the investor’s tax in year one, saving
the investor taxes on other income equal to the cost ($100) multiplied by the
taxpayer’s tax rate (assume 30%), or $30. The tax savings in the year of acquisition can be conceptualized as a government co-investment in the asset—the government invests $30 out of the $100 cost of the asset. The investor’s out-ofpocket investment is only $70. The government’s investment is repaid in later
years when taxes are owed on income generated from the asset.120 While technically the investor makes a tax payment when the asset earns income, their rate of
return is not diminished by tax.

116.
117.
118.

119.
120.

See Tax Cuts and Job Act, § 13201 (“Temporary 100-Percent Expensing for Certain Business
Assets”).
This is depreciation. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (2018) (authorizing a deduction for a “reasonable
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear” of capital assets).
Edward Kleinbard, Tax Policy is a Bore, Until They Take Your Social Security and Medicare Away,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2018, 4:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la
-oe-kleinbard-tax-health-20180415-story.html [https://perma.cc/E4TY-MVJF].
See Desai, supra note 114.
Consider this example: Assume the tax rate is a ﬂat 30% and the rate of return is 10%. TP
earns $100 in year one. He needs to pay $30 tax on the amount, leaving him $70 to spend. If
he invests instead, he will be entitled to expense the investment, so he has a $100 deduction
that allows him to invest $100 without any tax burden. A year later, the $100 grows to $110.
If he liquidates that to spend, he will owe tax at 30% or $33, leaving him $77. If he had invested
the original after-tax amount, $70 invested at 10% grows to $77 after a year; in an income tax,
the $7 would be subject to a 30% tax, leaving the investor with $4.66, for a total of $74.66. In
the expensed example, the taxpayer has $77 to spend. So, the amount available to spend with
expensing the investment is the same as the amount available to spend if the investment income (the $7) is explicitly exempt from tax.

429

the yale law journal forum

October 25, 2018

Deducting the full cost in the year of acquisition is the key to effectively exempting the income from tax. Any tax paid in later years can be understood as
the government receiving a return on its earlier investment. It does not matter
what the tax rate is, as long as the rate of the deduction in the year of acquisition
is the same as the rate of the amounts that are later included in income subject
to tax. It is as though the government invested 25%, 30%, or 50% of the cost of
the asset, and is later entitled to the same 25%, 30%, or 50% of the asset’s income.
The preference for things rather than people is reinforced by the TCJA’s
treatment of capital income compared to labor income. While labor has long
been subject to more burdensome taxation than capital,121 the TCJA exacerbates
this inequality. The TCJA did not change the payroll tax, which is a tax imposed
only on people who work. Instead, Congress reduced business taxes of all sorts—
corporate and pass-through taxation,122 as well as reducing the only tax the
United States has on accumulations of wealth, the estate and gift tax.123 All of
these changes favor things over people, stuff over services, physical goods over
experiences.
The real message of these provisions directly contradicts the rhetoric that its
adopters spread about the law. The TCJA’s proponents claimed that the law was
about creating jobs and improving the well-being of workers. But the law instead
favors machines and business owners. While it is possible to make an argument
that investments in machines will require more people, or that more money for
investors will trickle down to better wages for workers, there is nothing in the
rules adopted in the TCJA that gives taxpayers incentives for the second order
effects. It is just as likely that business owners will replace workers with machines.
conclusion
When we consider the social meaning of the particular provisions analyzed
in this Essay, it is not surprising that the distributional consequences of the law
are regressive. Each of the provisions discussed favors the affluent: traditional

121.

See Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113, 113 (2014)
(arguing that the tax burden on workers is too heavy, compared to the burden on capital holders).
122. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2096 (2017) (setting
the corporate tax rate at 21%, a reduction of between 4-14% depending on a corporation’s
income in excess of $50,000); id. § 11011 (adding deductions for qualiﬁed business income of
pass-through entities).
123. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11061 (increasing the exemption cap for estate and gift tax exemptions—e.g., the basic exclusion amount for estates or gifts made after December 31, 2017
was increased from $5 million to $10 million).
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families, capital holders, philanthropists, and businesses. The tax law contributes to the perpetuation of traditional power structures, so it is imperative that
scholars uncover its unarticulated biases. If parts of the tax law are borne of prejudice and inequality, it is crucial that those values are apparent. People need the
opportunity to openly object to the codiﬁcation of prejudice in the tax law. Obscuring the implicit messages of the tax law stiﬂes debate.
In this Essay, I have explored the implicit moral and political message in the
TCJA. In some examples, it is likely that the TCJA’s social meaning contradicts
the stated intention of its drafters. In other examples, the Act likely reﬂects the
unarticulated values of its framers. While I disagree with some of the values evidenced in the TCJA, my project here is not to debate them, but to expose them.
Policymakers and citizens make a grave error when they treat the tax law as
amorally technical or dispassionately economic.124 Only by explicitly identifying
values is it possible to start a discussion about them. Justice in taxation is not
possible without a full and honest examination of the law’s underlying principles.
Linda Sugin is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law at Fordham
Law School. I am grateful to Mary Louise Fellows for comments on an earlier draft and
Hanna Feldman for research assistance.
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See Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 2413, 2418-19 (2016).
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